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Background: Each year, college-age populations are increasingly reporting that they identify as
non-religious and are attending religious services less frequently, resulting in a larger presence of
a group known as religious “Nones.” In the past, social researchers have used religious affiliation
and attendance to predict opinions on political ideologies. However, with this increasing
prevalence of “Nones” among college-age populations, it is more difficult to use religious
variables to predict political views. In this paper, I will analyze recent GSS data and an original
survey to capture a contemporary picture of college-age respondents’ religiosity and political
beliefs.
Thesis: The purpose of my research is to provide a new perspective on the research of political
ideologies of college-aged religious Nones. I hypothesize that Loyola University Chicago
students will have higher rates of religiosity but will identify as more politically liberal than the
national population of 18-22 year-olds from the GSS sample.
Methods: My research methods include secondary data analysis of NORC’s General Social
Survey Data from the years 2016 and 2018, controlled to only include age groups of 18-22 at the
time of report. I also examine an original survey conducted via Qualtrics of Loyola University
Chicago students also aged 18-22 in 2021. I use mirrored questions on the original survey as the
GSS study in order to compare whether recent Loyola University students’ attitudes are
consistent with national data in terms of religiosity and political ideology. I use Stata to analyze
the data by creating new variables and running crosstabulations and frequencies.
Results: I find that Loyola University students identify significantly more liberal than the GSS
representative sample, for instance, 71.7 percent of Loyola students reported they were either
“Extremely liberal” or “Liberal” compared to just 23.2 percent of the GSS sample. However, I
find that there are very similar rates of religious Nones between the two samples. For example,
respondents from both populations reported comparable rates in not believing in a God, never
attending church, and non-affiliation with a religious group. Overall, those who identify as a
religious None are much more likely to be politically liberal than an affiliated person.
Implications: The results prove that the disaffiliation trend among college-aged populations is
still present even among a Catholic University sample. Additionally, both surveys show a
correlation between religious Nones and liberal political ideology. This could indicate that if the
trend of disaffiliation in young populations continues, a similar movement towards the left could
also emerge correspondingly.
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1
Introduction
Each year, college-age populations are increasingly reporting that they identify as nonreligious and are attending religious services less frequently, resulting in a larger presence of a
group known as religious “Nones.” In the past, social researchers have used religious affiliation
and attendance to predict opinions on populations’ political ideologies. However, with this
increasing prevalence of Nones among college-age populations, it is more difficult to use
religious variables to predict political views. This work is significant because traditionally, the
United States was founded on religious ideals and was predominantly Christian. This rate of
disaffiliation is unprecedented and therefore marks a turning point in the religious trajectory of
the country. Additionally, without having information on the political behavior of “Nones,”
social researchers will not have a true understanding of the modern political climate and how it is
changing. This is imperative for predicting political participation and orientation and thus
informing campaign strategies and legislative policies. In this paper, I will examine recent data
consisting of a national representative sample and an original survey in order to capture a
contemporary picture of college-age respondents’ religiosity and political beliefs. I hypothesize
that Loyola University Chicago students will have higher rates of religiosity but will identify as
more politically liberal than the national population of 18-22 year-olds from the GSS sample.

Literature Review
Disaffiliation and Religiosity
There is a notable trend in the United States in which more and more Americans are
becoming unaffiliated with religion, known as ‘disaffiliation’ or ‘secularization.’ Since the
1990s, there has been a steady increase in the number of individuals who claim they do not
belong to a major religious group. Strawn (2019) demonstrates that in the early 1990s, just about
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nine percent of the population was unaffiliated, but it rose to 22 percent by 2016. Currently, onefourth of the US population report they are religiously unaffiliated, and many churches of
varying groups, including Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, and Evangelical are reporting a
loss in members (Sepulvado et. al, 2015; Ladika, 2018). Most notably, for the first time since this
measurement began, 538 found in a recent Gallop poll that the number of Americans who are
affiliated with a church is now a minority, as 70 percent of Americans reported belonging to a
church or “house of worship” in the early 2000s, compared to just 43 percent today.
This sense of “belonging” to a religion is just one of a spectrum of factors that determine
“religiosity.” Religiosity can be broadly defined as how “religious” an individual is. In his 2021
book, Political Scientist Ryan Burge uses a classification system of three components to
holistically describe the term, known as the three ‘B’s.’ The first is Behavior, which Burge
describes as “tangible evidence of an individual’s faith,” such as reported church attendance or
participation in religious traditions; the next is Belonging, defined as “how people orient
themselves in social space,” for instance, self-identifying with a religious group or as a member
of a church; and the third is Belief, which represents the personal perspectives of people’s faith,
or lack thereof, in terms of religious ideology (Burge, 8-11). Using this framework, one can more
accurately portray the certain “religiosity” of an individual in wake of the disaffiliation trend.
People who are religiously unaffiliated are known in the social science world as religious
“Nones,” and include three distinct groups: atheists, agnostics, and individuals who are nonreligious but fail to identify with the aforementioned terms, simply called “nothing in
particulars.” Ladika (2018) and Schwadel (2020) demonstrate the extent to how Nones are
emerging in prevalence in the American religious landscape: according to a recent Pew Research
Center survey they increased seven percentage points from 2007 to 2014 and are currently
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considered “one of the three largest religious groups in the nation, along with Catholics and
evangelical Protestants” (Schawdel, 180). In particular, the sector of Nones known as “nothing in
particulars” are significant in that they make up a great majority of those who identify as nonreligious, with only 31 percent of Nones classifying themselves as atheist or agnostic (Ladika,
803). Additionally, they are the fastest-growing cohort out of any other religious group in
America, contributing to a majority of the disaffiliation trend in the country. Overall, Burge
claims, “there is no segment of American society that has been immune to the rise of religious
disaffiliation" (93). For example, the demographics of contemporary religious Nones as
representative of the racial and ethnic makeup of the United States, as well as increasingly more
diverse in gender (Burge, 70).

Religiosity and political views
The disaffiliation trend is inherently political and thus ties closely with political ideology
and polarization in the country. In fact, a majority of Americans attend a church that aligns with
their political views, instead of letting their religion dictate their political affiliation (Burge, 54).
This polarization phenomenon is exemplified in a study by Djupe et. al (2018) on the importance
of affiliation in the role of politics: “Democrats have reduced their attendance at religious
services in recent years, presumably as a reaction to what they perceive to be a close connection
between organized religion and the Republican Party” (161).
In terms of the political ideology of the non-affiliated, Nones are by no means politically
homogenous. Despite their variety, None ideology can be generalized as mostly left-leaning.
Burge provides that, “from 2018, the unaffiliated included 43.6 percent of liberals, 30.5 percent
of those who lean liberal, 21.7 percent of moderates, 13 percent of those who lean conservative,
and just 9.8 percent of those who identified as conservative” (52). Each year, the percentage of

4
Democratic voters becomes increasingly a larger portion of Nones, exemplifying the intersection
of political polarization and the disaffiliation trend (538).
The reason behind this diversity in opinion can be attributed to the three mutually
exclusive groups of Nones: atheists, agnostics, and “nothing in particulars.” Atheists are by far
the most liberal, frequently voting for Democratic candidates, and are the most politically active,
according to Burge (110-121). Agnostics’ views are similar to atheists, skewing to the left, but
somewhat more subdued as they are not quite as liberal and politically engaged as atheists are.
On the other hand, Schwadel (2020) presents that the “nothing in particulars” group differ from
the other Nones in that they are much more likely to identify as conservative, with 16 percent
aligning with the Republican party compared to just five percent and six percent of atheists and
agnostics, respectively (185). Additionally, Schwadel demonstrates that “nothing in particulars”
report remarkable disinterest in politics and the political process in general, as they are much less
likely to be politically active (180). Overall, in comparing the Nones to religiously affiliated
Americans, Strawn reveals that both groups are “close to the moderate center” on average,
however, Nones skew slightly more to the left (713).

College-aged groups
Another significant variable to consider when viewing religious ideology and political
beliefs is age. In particular, the college-age population, roughly ages 18-22, is especially
interesting to examine due to their unique circumstance in life, since the transformation into an
independent adult is quite a formative time for many. Oftentimes, college-age groups experience
a transitional period in which they may also form new or stronger personal political and religious
beliefs.
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A noteworthy pattern that arises in terms of religiosity and age is that each younger
generation has a larger portion of people who identify as unaffiliated from religion than the
previous. More than 40 percent of Millennials and Generation Z subjects report that they are
unaffiliated, and Gen Z has been deemed the “first truly ‘post-Christian generation,” as they
report double the number of atheists as the greater US adult population (538; Ladika, 804).
Ladika reports that, “young adults also are less likely to believe in God or to pray, and are more
likely to say religion is not important in their lives” (807). This trend could be explained by
young populations being more likely to identify as politically liberal, and a common hypothesis
is that they are turned off by religion due to some church groups’ more conservative social
values such as same-sex marriage. The intersectional nature of religion and politics seems to
reciprocally inform young Americans in their ideologies.

Design
The purpose of my paper is to provide a new perspective on the research of political
ideologies of religious Nones. In particular, I extend upon the work of Political Scientist and
author Ryan P. Burge and Sociologist K. D. Strawn who have incorporated General Social
Survey data in their analyses.
I will conduct a contrast of cases design, which involves secondary data analysis of
NORC’s General Social Survey Data from the years 2016 and 2018, controlled to only include
age groups of 18-22 at the time of report. The other case I will examine is an original survey
conducted via Qualtrics of Loyola University Chicago students also aged 18-22 in 2021. I will
use the same questions as the GSS study in the original survey for the purpose of comparison and
so that the variables will be structured in a mirrored fashion for data analysis. I will then compare
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the results of the two surveys and analyze whether recent Loyola University Chicago students'
attitudes are consistent with national data in terms of religiosity and political ideology.

Data and methods
The General Social Survey is administered by the National Opinion Research Center
(NORC) at the University of Chicago, a nonpartisan research organization. It has been conducted
since 1972 and is a nationally representative sample of US adults (NORC, 2021). I chose to use
GSS data to view a nationwide perspective of the disaffiliation trend in young adults rather than
just a sub-sample of the population. Another reason the GSS data was compelling to use was its
questions, which are quite detailed and personal. The study also includes a multitude of specific
questions on the topics of religiosity and political ideology. The GSS survey data was obtained
from their public domain and cleaned so that it only included the 2016 and 2018 studies and
respondents aged 18-22 at the time of response. I used the social sciences statistical application
Stata to conduct all of my analyses.
After the controls were put in place, I was left with a total of 273 GSS respondents from
the two respective years. The GSS survey responses are represented in each table below in the
‘0’ column. As seen in Table 1.1, 49.08 percent of respondents were male and 50.92 percent
were female. The GSS survey only included male and female options for gender identity. In
terms of race and ethnicity, 75.37 percent reported they were not Hispanic and the remaining
24.63 percent identified as some form of Hispanic, shown in Table 1.2. Furthermore, Table 1.3
displays that 64.84 percent of respondents were White, 19.05 percent were Black or African
American, and 16.12 percent reported as another race. The GSS survey for the variable ‘race’
only included the options White, Black, or Other. The age breakdown, shown in Table 1.4,
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reveals that 10.62 percent of respondents were age 18, 21.61 percent were age 19, 15.02 percent
were age 20, 21.98 percent were age 21, and 30.77 percent were 22 at the time of report.

Table 1.1 Gender

Table 1.2 Hispanic

Table 1.3 Race

Table 1.4 GSS age

I created the entirety of my original survey on Qualtrics, which I then exported for
analysis on Stata. I recruited only Loyola University Chicago students and solely included
respondents who were between the ages of 18 and 22 so that I could specifically note
descriptives based on those factors. I used a convenience sample, which is not representative of
the national population, or Loyola University students, for that matter. My methods of
recruitment involved contacting students in my extended circles, such as friends, classmates,
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students in the Sociology department, members of clubs and extra-curriculars I am involved in,
co-workers, and advertising on my personal social media platforms.
I ended up with a total of 155 responses from the time period between November 22nd,
2021 and November 30th, 2021. After removing five responses that either reported they were not
between the ages of 18 and 22 or were not Loyola University students, I was left with a total of
150 respondents, with some questions with fewer reported responses due to some failing to
complete all the questions on the survey. Each table represents the Loyola student population
under the column labeled as ‘1’.
Table 1.1 shows that 25.33 percent of respondents are male, 69.33 percent identify as
female, and 5.33 percent (8) students identify as non-binary or gender non-conforming. I added
the third option to be inclusive for my respondents, as the GSS only included options for male or
female. There are similar reports of ethnicity to the GSS sample, with 82 percent identifying as
non-Hispanic and 18 percent identifying as Hispanic displayed in Table 1.2. For race, there is a
comparable proportion of White respondents between the two surveys, with 69.8 percent, and
significantly fewer Black or African American respondents in the Loyola population compared
to the GSS sample, with only 6.04 percent, and an increase of eight percentage points from the
GSS for those who identify as another race, with 24.16 percent, displayed in Table 1.3. On my
survey, I listed 1. White, 2. Black or African American, 3. Asian, 4. Native American, 5.
Other/Not listed, and 6. Two or more races as options. I then recoded answers 3, 4, and 6 as
‘Other’ to match the GSS race variable’s structure of White, Black or Other.

Findings
Descriptives
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In this section of my findings, I will show the comparisons of the basic descriptives
between the two surveys of most of the key variables that I examined. In every table, the column
labeled ‘0’ will represent the GSS respondents, and the column labeled ‘1’ will represent the
Loyola student population.
As I stated before, there are a multitude of ways to define religiosity. One definition is
“belonging” such as membership to a religious group. As you can see in Table 2, which provided
respondents with options for the most prominent religious groups, there are significantly more
Protestants in the GSS sample than the Loyola sample. Additionally, there is a fairly similar
number of Catholics in both surveys, which is surprising to me because I anticipated an
overrepresentation of this group at Loyola since it is a Catholic institution. Another important
finding is that there are quite similar rates of those who reported they had no religious preference
(which thus can be considered “Nones”), with 34.44 percent of GSS and 32.62 of Loyola
students. This opposes my original hypothesis that the Loyola student population would have
higher rates of religiosity. Lastly, there is an extreme overrepresentation of those who chose
‘Other’ religious group for Loyola students.
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Table 2 Religious group

Table 3 Strength of religion

Next, Table 3 asked respondents if they would call themselves a strong (religious
preference) or a not very strong (religious preference) to measure religiosity. To my surprise, the
GSS population was around 3.5 times more likely to report that they were strongly affiliated to
whichever religion they were a part of, opposing my original hypothesis that Loyola students
would be more religious than the overall population. Again, there are nearly exact rates, within
one percentage point, of those who responded “No religion,” considered “Nones,” which also
goes against my original hypothesis.
Another way of measuring religiosity is by behavior, or church attendance, for example.
This survey question, shown in Table 4, asked respondents how often they attended religious
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services. Between the two surveys, there were consistently similar levels of Nones, or those who
never attend church. The most significant difference is that three-fourths of Loyola students
reported they either never went to church, attended less than one year, or about once or twice a
year, compared to only a third of GSS respondents. Still, this indicates a high concentration of
young adults who do not attend church frequently across the board, validating the youth
disaffiliation trend. In every sector with more frequent attendance than “several times a year”,
GSS respondents attended church more than Loyola students, therefore further disproving my
hypothesis that Loyola students would have higher religiosity rates.

Table 4 Attendance

Table 5 Belief in God
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A third dimension of defining religiosity is belief. This survey question in Table 5 asked,
“Please tell me which statement comes closest to expressing what you believe about God”: a. I
don’t believe in God; b. I don’t know whether there is a God and I don’t believe there is any way
to find out; c. I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind;
d. I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others; e. While I have doubts, I
feel that I do believe in God; f. I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it. Table 5
reports incredibly similar rates of “Nones,” respondents who answered they did not believe in
God. Also, significantly more GSS respondents state they had no doubts whether God existed,
implying that the GSS sample has higher levels of religiosity.
In terms of political views, in Table 6 there was a Likert-scale style question in which
respondents place themselves on a scale of 1-7, ranging from Extremely liberal to Extremely
conservative. In accordance with my hypothesis, there is an extreme liberal skew for Loyola
students. For instance, nearly three-fourths of Loyola students report that they were either
Extremely liberal or Liberal compared to not even one-fourth of GSS respondents. Furthermore,
only 1 out of 100 Loyola students reported they were Conservative compared to one in 10 of the
GSS sample. Also, not a single respondent from the Loyola population reported they identified
as extremely conservative. The most frequently chosen orientation for the GSS sample was
Moderate, while for Loyola it was Liberal, with nearly half of respondents choosing this option.
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Table 6 Political views

Table 7 Party identification

I also measured respondents’ party identification, with options for Strong Democrat; Not
very strong Democrat; Independent, close to Democrat; Independent; Independent, close to
Republican; Not very strong Republican and Strong Republican, shown in Table 7. Again, there
was an extremely heavy Democratic preference for Loyola students. Less than 6.5 percent of the
Loyola population reported they identified as some form of Republican (Independent, close to
Republican, Not very strong Republican, or Strong Republican) compared to almost 30 percent
of the GSS sample. These findings further confirm my hypothesis that Loyola students would be
more liberal than the national 18-22 year-old population.
Lastly, I measured two social issues to have a more well-rounded representation of
political ideology. One of the variables asked if respondents thought it should be possible for a
pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason. As seen in
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Table 8, there is an extremely opposing response between the two survey populations: the GSS
respondents are nearly split 50/50 on the issue compared to Loyola students having an extreme
majority (95.89 percent) towards permitting abortion.

Table 8 Abortion

Analyses
In this section of the findings, I ran crosstabulations to create more complex and nuanced
analyses of the variables. I also created some new variables to better represent “Nones” in
comparison to the religious populations. In every newly recoded variable, Nones are coded as 0,
and religious affiliates are coded as 1. For example, in the aforementioned survey question which
asked respondents about their belief in God, I separated the responses by what I deemed as
Nones and religious people. The responses “I do not believe in God” and “I am not sure if there
is a God and I don’t believe there is any way to find out” were coded as 0, as Nones, while the
other 4 options, indicating varying levels of belief in God, were coded as 1.
Table 9 below uses this newly recoded variable, belief in a God or not, and compares
political ideologies of both the GSS and Loyola populations combined. I found that those who
say they don’t believe in God or believe there is no way to find out have a likelihood to identify
as Liberal. 6 out of 10 Nones identified as Extremely liberal or Liberal, in comparison to just one
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out of three of those who displayed some level of believing in God. Inversely, religious folks
were 3.7 times more likely to report that they were Conservative compared to Nones.
Additionally, a significant portion of both identify as Moderate, with a larger proportion of
religious folks than the non-religious.

Table 9 Nones x Political views

Table 10 Strongly religious x Political views

Another variable I created to compare religiosity was the question on how strongly
affiliated one was with their chosen religious group. In this newly created variable, I separated
those who stated they were strongly affiliated with their chosen religion, coded 1, and the
remaining options (Not very strong, Somewhat strong, and No religion), coded 0. When
examining this in a crosstabulation of political ideology, shown in Table 10 above, there is a
relationship between those who identified strongly with their religious preference being less
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liberal than their less religious counterparts. For instance, each liberal ideological category had
notably less respondents of those who said they had a strong religious affiliation than those who
weren’t strongly affiliated with their religion of choice.
I also conducted a table involving three variables, religiosity, political ideology, and
which survey the respondents were from to separate the GSS population from the Loyola
students. In this table, I created a new variable from the original survey question which religious
group the respondent belonged to. I coded those who selected a religious group as 1 (religiously
affiliated) and those who selected “No religion” as 0 (None). Again, the GSS sample is
represented in Table 11 below as 0 (meaning non-student) and the Loyola sample is represented
as 1 (student). The political ideology is measured by a Likert scale ranging from 1-7, with
‘Extremely liberal’ represented as 1 to ‘Extremely conservative’ as 7. The table shows the GSS
non-religious population’s average political ideology was 3.5, which is between ‘Slightly liberal’
and ‘Moderate’, while the religious GSS population’s average ideology was ‘Moderate’ (4).
Overall, the GSS average stance was also leaning ‘Moderate’. On the other hand, the nonreligious Loyola student average political views were close to “Liberal’, while the Loyola
religious portion was between ‘Liberal’ and ‘Slightly liberal’. Overall, the Loyola student
populations’ average ideology was ‘Liberal’. This further verifies my original hypothesis that the
Loyola student survey would be more liberal than the GSS sample.
Table 11 None x Political views x Survey respondent
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I also created a crosstabulation of the recoded variable separating those who identified
with a religious group and Nones with party identification. Table 12 shows those who marked
they did not belong to a major religious group were twice as likely to report they were a ‘Strong
Democrat’ as opposed to affiliated folks. Inversely, Nones were half as likely to report they were
a ‘Not very strong Republican’ or a ‘Strong Republican’ than the religious population. However,
the religious group most frequently reported category was ‘Not very strong Democrats’,
indicating that young religious folks from the surveys lean Democrat. Thus, overall, 18-22 yearolds display a preference for the Democratic party.

Table 12 None x Party identification

Table 13 Attendance x Party identification

Furthermore, I created a new variable to measure attendance. The variable is coded 0 to
represent those who reported they never attend church and 1 for those who said they attend
church at least once a year. When factoring in political party preference, in Table 13, I found a
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relationship between Nones and the Democratic and Independent parties. For example, one in
four people who reported they never attend church said they were a ‘Strong Democrat’. On the
other hand, people who attend church at least once a year were twice as likely to be a ‘Strong
Republican’ than someone who never attends church.
I also measured two social issues, national welfare expense and abortion views, to
measure a wider spectrum of political ideology. When analyzing a crosstabulation of religiosity
with the welfare question, which states; “We are faced with many problems in this country, none
of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re
spending too much money, too little money, or about the right amount on welfare?: Too little,
About right, or Too much?” I found a strong correlation between Nones believing that we spend
too little on welfare. For instance, in Table 14, six out of ten Nones reported they think we are
spending too little on welfare, while just 17 percent stated we are spending too much. Overall, a
significant portion of 18-22 year-olds hold the belief that we aren’t spending enough on welfare,
with one out of two religiously affiliated members stating we aren’t spending enough.

Table 14 Nones x Welfare

Table 15 Strongly religious x Welfare
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I also found that those who have a strong religious preference are significantly less likely
to believe that we are spending too little on welfare compared to other less religious groups.
Table 15 shows that the most frequently chosen option from those who have a strong affinity to
their chosen religious group is that we are spending too much on welfare.
Lastly, I analyzed the respondents’ views on abortion and religiosity. The abortion survey
question asked respondents if they think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a
legal abortion if the woman wants it for any reason. In the table below, I examined the abortion
views of Nones (those who said they didn’t believe in God or thought there was no way to find
out) and found that the religiously affiliated population was three times more likely to not
support a woman to obtain an abortion for any reason. The overwhelming majority of Nones
support permitting abortion, however, two out of three religiously affiliated people also support
permitting abortion, indicating that 18-22 year-olds from both samples combined mostly support
abortion rights.

Table 16 None x Abortion

Table 17 None x Abortion x Survey respondent

However, I found a significant difference in abortion attitudes between the GSS religious
and None populations, indicating that the Loyola student sample is more liberal ideologically
than the national population. The GSS non-religious population mostly favored permitting
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abortion, with 7 out of 10 respondents, while less than half of the GSS religiously affiliation
population supported abortion. On the other hand, despite religiosity status, Loyola’s student
population almost unanimously supported abortion: 100 percent of non-religious Loyola students
were in favor of abortion, and only six percent of the religiously affiliated folks were opposed to
abortion rights. Overall, non-religious young populations are much more likely to support
abortion than non-religious.

Limitations
There are some limitations in my research that could possibly have influenced the results.
To begin with, the Loyola student sample was a convenience sample and not representative of
the Loyola student population, let alone a national sample of US 18-22 year-olds. Loyola’s
student body is overwhelmingly female, and thus seventy percent of the Loyola respondents
were female, which could have skewed my results to the left, particularly the abortion question.
Additionally, since it was a convenience sample, most of the respondents were either my friends
who share similar values as me or were Sociology majors who tend to hold more liberal or
alternative views than the average college student. Also, Loyola is located in Chicago, one of the
largest Democratic cities in the country. Lastly, Loyola is a liberal school in general which
implements more liberal policies than most Universities in the country. All of these reasons
could have contributed to the results of my survey leaning more politically liberal.
Next, another major limitation is even though all of the respondents were in the same age
group when they took the survey, the surveys were not taken in the same years. The GSS sample
was composed of 18-22 year-olds who took the survey in the years 2016 and 2018 while the
Loyola students were 18-22 in 2021. That means that a 22 year-old taking the GSS survey in
2016 would be 27 in 2021, resulting in a larger age range. This age gap could contribute to some
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of the marginal differences I found in results such as the GSS populations’ slightly more
conservative political ideology. Much has changed in the last 5 years, and a GSS respondent may
not have answered the same in today’s political or religious climate.
Something I would have done differently in my survey was include an option for
respondents to fill in what their preferred religious group is if they chose ‘Other/Not listed,’ to
see what groups they belong to. One-fifth of the Loyola student population chose this option,
despite including the most popular religious groups in the world. This is something that could be
further explored in another study of Loyola students' religious preferences.
Lastly, it’s possible that the results of the religious service attendance question could
have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic as it was in full swing during the execution of
my study. The pandemic may have inclined some students to attend church less than they
normally would.

Conclusion
Originally, I hypothesized that Loyola University Chicago students would identify as
more politically liberal than the GSS national sample. My hypothesis was confirmed in every
measure of political ideology I analyzed: in political ideology, party identification, and social
views like national welfare expense and abortion views, the Loyola students expressed more
liberal views than the GSS sample.
My other hypothesis was that Loyola University Chicago students will have higher rates
of religiosity since it is a Catholic Jesuit University. After conducting my analysis, I found that
this hypothesis was proven wrong as I found very similar rates of religious Nones between the
two samples, with an average of about 32 percent from each. For instance, respondents from both
populations reported quite comparable rates of not believing in a God, never attending church,
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and non-affiliation with a religious group. All in all, ‘No religion’ was the most commonly
selected religious group.
I also found that overall those who identify as a religious None are much more likely to
be politically liberal than an affiliated person. This correlation was unanimously present in every
crosstabulation I conducted. Furthermore, those who are strongly religious with their chosen
religious group are even more so likely to be conservative than their less religious counterparts.
This revelation emphasizes a distinction even within religious populations themselves.

Implications
The results prove that the disaffiliation trend among college-aged populations is still
present (even among a Catholic University sample) as a third of young adults identify as Nones.
As both surveys show a correlation between religious Nones and liberal political ideology, this
could indicate that if the trend of disaffiliation in young populations continues, a similar
movement towards the left among young adults could also emerge correspondingly.
However, even though a significant portion of the college-age populations are Nones,
many still believe in a God or are spiritual in some manner. This phenomenon is further
exemplified in that the GSS sample has higher rates of religiosity than the Loyola student
sample. This could imply that college students are less religious than the overall population of
18-22 year-olds, which are not necessarily all students. It’s also possible that this age group is
participating in other less communal activities than attending church to express their religion.
This leaves more to explore in further research.
Ultimately, when interpreting the disaffiliation trend through a political lens, social
researchers will have a greater understanding of the contemporary political and religious
landscape of young adults.
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Appendix I: General Social Survey
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972-2018: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK
December 2019
Conducted for The National Data Program for the Social Sciences at NORC University of
Chicago
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Appendix II: Original Qualtrics Survey
1. Are you a student at Loyola University Chicago?
0: No
1: Yes
2. Are you between the ages of 18 and 22?
0: No
1: Yes
3. What is your gender identity?
1: Male
2: Female
3: Non-binary/gender non-conforming
4. Are you Hispanic or Latino/Latina?
1: No
2: Yes
5. What is your race?
1: White
2: Black
3: Asian
4: Native American
5: Other/not listed
6: Two or more races
6. What is your religious preference?
1: Protestantism
2: Catholicism
3: Judaism
4: Buddhism
5: Hinduism
6: Islam
7: Other/not listed
8: None
7. Would you call yourself a strong ____ or not very strong ____ (religious preference
named in previous question)?
1: Strong
2: Not very strong
3: Somewhat strong
4: No religion
8. How often do you attend religious services?
0: Never
1: Less than once a year
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2: Once or twice a year
3: Several times a year
4: About once a month
5: 2-3 times a month
6: Nearly every week
7: Every week
8: Several times a week
9. Please tell me which statement comes closest to expressing what you believe about
God.
1: I don’t believe in God
2: I don’t know whether there is a God and I don’t believe there is any way to
find out
3: I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some
kind
4: I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others
5: While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God
6: I know God really exists and I have no doubts about it
10. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Where would you
place yourself on this scale arranged from extremely liberal (point 1) to extremely
conservative (point 7)?
1: Extremely liberal
2: Liberal
3: Slightly liberal
4: Moderate, middle of the road
5: Slightly conservative
6: Conservative
7: Extremely conservative
11. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat,
Independent, or what?
0: Strong Democrat
1: Weak Democrat
2: Independent, lean Democrat
3: Independent
4: Independent, lean Republican
5: Weak Republican
6: Strong Republican
12. We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved
easily or inexpensively. I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too
much money, too little money, or about the right amount on welfare?
1: Too little
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2: About right
3: Too much
13. Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant person
to obtain a legal abortion if they want it for any reason?
0: No
1: Yes
14. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?
1: The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word
2: The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken
literally
3: The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts
recorded by man

